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Abstract
The worst-case Lipschitz constant of an n-player k-action δ-perturbed
game, λ(n, k, δ), is characterised. In the case of k ≥ 3, λ(n, k, δ) is
identified with the passage probability of a certain symmetric random
walk on Z. The other case, k = 2, is estimated asymptotically, while it
is conjectured to equal the probability that two i.i.d. Binomial random
variables are equal.
1 Introduction
The interest in the Lipschitz constant of perturbed anonymous games began
with Goldberg and Turchetta [4] who presented an efficient algorithm for
computing approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player 2-action anonymous
games. Their algorithm relies on the existence of an approximate equilib-
rium that uses perturbed pure strategies (each action gets replaced by the
uniformly mixed strategy with some small positive probability δ). The exis-
tence of such an equilibrium is guaranteed (due to Azrieli and Shmaya [1])
since perturbed anonymous games admit a small Lipschitz constant. The
premise of the method of Goldberg and Turchetta [4] depends on how tightly
one manages estimates the Lipschitz constant of the perturbed game. Gold-
berg and Turchetta [4] obtained an inverse polynomial upper-bound (in n, the
number of players, assuming 2 actions for each player) which enabled them
to prove that their algorithm was polynomial. Cheng et al. [2], improved
the upper-bound and extended it to any number of actions, k, showing that
the Lipschitz constant is O˜
(√
k9(δn)−1
)
. We provide an asymptotically
sharp approximation for the worst-case Lipschitz constant λ = λ(n, k, δ) by
identifying it with a passage time of a certain symmetric random walk on
1
Z. For example, our characterisation implies that λ = O
(√
k(δn)−1
)
, as
δ + k(δn)−1 → 0.
2 Definitions and the result
2.1 Lipschitz constant
An n-player k-action game is a function g : [k]n → [0, 1]n. The Hamming
distance between two pure strategy profiles a, b ∈ [k]n is defined as
ρ(a, b) = |{i ∈ [n] : ai 6= bi}|.
Following Azrieli and Shmaya [1], the Lipschitz constant of g is defined as
λ(g) = max |gi(a)− gi(b)|,
where the maximum is over all i ∈ [n] and a, b ∈ [k]n such that ai = bi and
ρ(a, b) = 1.
2.2 Perturbation
For 0 < δ < 1, the δ-perturbation of a strategy ai ∈ [k] is the following
mixture of ai and the uniform distribution u ∼ Uniform([k]),
aδi = (1− δ)ai + δu.
The δ-perturbation of g is the game gδ : [k]n → [0, 1]n defined by
gδ(a1, . . . , an) = E
[
g(aδ1, . . . , a
δ
n)
]
.
2.3 Anonymous games
A game g is called anonymous if, for every i ∈ [n], gi(·) is a function of i’s
own action and the number of other players who take each action j ∈ [k].
Formally, g is anonymous if gi(a) = gi(b), for every i ∈ [n] and every a, b ∈
[k]n such that ai = bi and |{i′ ∈ [n] : ai′ = j}| = |{i′ ∈ [n] : bi′ = j}|, for
every j ∈ [k].
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2.4 Symmetric random walk on Z
Our first result refers to the symmetric random walk on Z with (stationary)
rate r, which is a sequence of random variables, Sr0 , S
r
1 , . . ., whose law is
defined by
P (Sr0 = 0) = 1,
P (Srn+1 − Srn = 0|Srn) = 1− r,
P (Srn+1 − Srn = +1|Srn) = P (Srn+1 − Srn = −1|Srn) = r2 .
2.5 Our results
Our objective is to characterise the worst-case Lipschitz constant of anony-
mous games defined by
λ(n, k, δ) = maxλ(gδ),
where the maximum is over all n-player k-action anonymous games.
For games with k ≥ 3 actions we obtain the following characterisation.
Theorem 1. For every n ≥ 2, k ≥ 3, and δ ∈ (0, 1),
λ(n, k, δ) = (1− δ)P (S2δ/kn−2 ∈ {0, 1}).
An analogous result for the case of k = 2 remains open (see Conjec-
ture 11).
We obtain the following asymptotically sharp approximation for the case
that n is large relative to k and δ−1.
Theorem 2. For k ≥ 3,
lim
nδ
k
→∞
(1− δ)−1
√
pinδ
k
× λ(n, k, δ) = 1.
For k = 2,
lim
nδ→∞
(1− δ)−1
√
pinδ(1− δ/2) × λ(n, 2, δ) = 1.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 The reflection principle
A symmetric random walk on Z is a sequence of random variables, S1, S2 . . .,
such that the increments Ii := Si − Si−1 (where S0 := 0) satisfy
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• I1, I2, . . . ∈ {0, 1,−1},
• I1, I2, . . . are mutually independent,
• E[Ii] = 0, for all i.
We will use the following property of symmetric random walks.1
Lemma 3 (Reflection Principle). Let S1, . . . , Sn be a symmetric random walk
on Z, then
P (S1, . . . , Sn < 1) = P (Sn ∈ {0, 1}).
Proof. Let T = min{t ∈ N : St = 1}. The event {T ≤ n} is the complement
of the event {S1, . . . , Sn < 1}, and
P (T ≤ n) = P (Sn > 1, T ≤ n) + P (Sn < 1, T ≤ n) + P (Sn = 1, T ≤ n)
= 2P (Sn > 1, T ≤ n) + P (Sn = 1, T ≤ n) = 2P (Sn > 1) + P (Sn = 1)
= P (Sn > 1) + P (Sn < −1) + P (Sn = 1)
= P (Sn /∈ {−1, 0}) = P (Sn /∈ {0, 1}).
3.2 The Poisson Binomial distribution
A Standard Poisson Binomial random variable is a finite sum of independent
(not necessarily identically distributed) Bernoulli random variables. We de-
fine a Poisson Binomial (PB) random variable as the sum of a Standard
Poisson Binomial random variable and an integer. Note the if X and Y are
PB random variables, so are X + Y and X − Y . The distribution of a PB
random variable is called a PB distribution.
A PB distribution is uni-modal and its mode is attain at the mean up to
rounding to a near by integer (see [7]). It follows that if X is a PB random
variable, then the total variation distance between X and X +1 is the value
of X at it’s mode. We will use the following conclusion.
Lemma 4. Let X be a PB random variable with µ = E[X ]. We have,
dTV (X,X + 1) = max
t∈Z
P (X = t) = max{P (X = ⌊µ⌋), P (X = ⌈µ⌉)}.
1The reflection principle has become folklore in the theory of random walks. We were
not able to find out who was the first one to use it.
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A PB distribution with a large variance can be approximated by a normal
distribution with the same mean and variance in a very strong sense. Let
φ(x) = 1√
2pi
e
x
2
2 be the the standard normal density. The following lemma is
taken from Pitman [5, Eq. (25)] who attributes it to Platnov [6].
Lemma 5. Let X be a PB random variable with µ = E[X ], and σ2 =
V ar[X ]. For every t ∈ Z,∣∣∣∣σP (X = t)− φ
(
t− µ
σ
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cσ ,
for some global constant C.
4 Proofs
We denote the indicator vector of an action j ∈ [k] by ej ∈ Rk. For a strategy
profile a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ [k]n, define
N(a) =
n∑
i=1
eai .
Namely, N(a) ∈ Zk+ is the vector that counts the number players who take
each one of the actions. Since a perturbed action profile aδ = (aδ1, . . . , a
δ
n)
is a random variable that takes values in [k]n, N(aδ) is a random variable
that takes values in Zk+. Given an anonymous game g : [k]
n → [0, 1]n, and a
player i ∈ [n], gi(·) is a function of ai and N(a−i); therefore, for any action
ai ∈ [k], gδi (ai, a−i) = E[f(N(aδ−i))], for some function f : Zk+ → [0, 1]. Since
any such f can be realised by setting gi(ai, a−i) = f(N(a−i)),
λ(n, k, δ) = max
f,a,b
E
[
f(N(aδ))
]− E [f(N(bδ))] ,
where the maximum if over all f : Zk+ → [0, 1], and a, b ∈ [k]n−1 subject
to ρ(a, b) = 1. The maximum on the right-hand side is attained when f
achieves the total variation distance between N(aδ) and N(bδ); therefore, by
(arbitrarily) fixing the place in which a and b differ, we have
λ(n, k, δ) = max
a∈[k]n−2
dTV
(
eδ1 +N(a
δ), eδ2 +N(a
δ)
)
= (1− δ) max
a∈[k]n−2
dTV
(
e1 +N(a
δ), e2 +N(a
δ)
)
, (4.1)
where dTV (·, ·) denotes the total variation distance.
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4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In light of (4.1), the next lemma implies the upper bound of Theorem 1.
Lemma 6. For every k ≥ 2, n ≥ 1, and 0 < δ < 1,
max
a∈[k]n
dTV (e1 +N(a
δ), e2 +N(a
δ)) ≤ P (S2δ/kn ∈ {0, 1}).
Proof. Let a ∈ [k]n be arbitrary. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {e1, . . . , ek} be inde-
pendent random vectors indicating the realisations of aδ1, . . . , a
δ
n respectively.
Namely,
P (Xi = ej) =
{
1− δ + δ
k
j = ai,
δ
k
j 6= ai,
We would like to construct a coupling (Zn, Z
′
n) such that Zn ∼ e1 +∑n
i=1Xi, Z
′
n ∼ e2 +
∑n
i=1Xi and P (Zn 6= Z ′n) ≤ η−
1
2 +O(η−1). To this end,
we define random variables X ′1, . . . , X
′
n that have the same joint distribution
as X1, . . . , Xn, and let Zm = e1 +
∑m
i=1Xi and Z
′
m = e2 +
∑m
i=1X
′
i, for every
m = 1, . . . , n.
Informally, each X ′i is going to be defined to be e2 wherever Xi = e1
and vice-versa, as long as Zi−1 6= Z ′i−1, and X ′i = Xi otherwise (either if
Xi /∈ {e1, e2}, or once Zi−1 = Z ′i−1).
Formally, the random variables X1, . . . , Xn are realised as follows:
Xi = χieUi + (1− χi)eai ,
where χ1, . . . , χn ∼ Bernoulli(δ), U1, . . . , Un ∼ Uniform([k]) are all inde-
pendent random variables.
The X ′i-s are coupled with the Xi-s through the following definition:
X ′i = χieU ′i + (1− χi)eai ,
where U ′1, . . . , U
′
n are defined recursively by
U ′i =
{
3− Ui Zi−1 6= Z ′i−1 and Ui ∈ [2],
Ui otherwise,
setting Z0 = e1, Z
′
0 = e2.
We explain whyX ′1, . . . , X
′
n are indeed independent random variables with
Xi ∼ aδi for every i ∈ [n]. Let Fi = σ〈χ1, U1, . . . , χi, Ui〉. By its definition, the
distribution of U ′i is uniform in [k] conditioned on Fi−1, for every i; therefore
X ′i ∼ aδi conditioned on Fi−1. Furthermore, X ′i is Fi-measurable ; therefore
X ′i ∼ aδi conditioned on X ′1, . . . , X ′i−1.
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The definition of X ′i is so that Zi = Z
′
i implies that Zi+1 = Z
′
i+1, for every
i ∈ [n − 1]; therefore Zn = Z ′n iff there exists i ∈ [n] such that Zi = Z ′i.
Furthermore, for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n and 3 ≤ j ≤ k, (Zi)j = (Z ′i)j and
(Zi)1 + (Zi)2 = (Z
′
i)1 + (Z
′
i)2; therefore Zn = Z
′
n iff there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that (Zi)1 = (Z
′
i)1.
Set Si := 1−(Zi)1+(Z ′i)1, i = 0, . . . , n. Note that Si is almost a symmetric
random walk on Z with the exception that it stays put forever once it hits
1. A direct calculation shows that conditioned on Si 6= 1,
Si+1 =


Si w.p. 1− 2δk ,
Si + 1 w.p.
δ
k
,
Si − 1 w.p. δk .
(4.2)
Since (4.2) is exactly the rule of (S
2δ/k
i )
∞
i=0 (unlike Si, S
2δ/k
i does not stop
when it hits 1), Lemma 3 concludes the proof of Lemma 6.
The following lemma states that the upper-bound of Lemma 6 is tight in
case that k ≥ 3.
Lemma 7. For every k ≥ 3, n ≥ 1, and 0 < δ < 1,
max
a∈[k]n
dTV (e1 +N(a
δ), e2 +N(a
δ)) ≥ P (S2δ/kn ∈ {0, 1}).
Proof. Consider the strategy profile 3¯ ∈ [k]n in which all of the players take
action 3. LetX be the random variable that counts the difference between the
number of players who play 1 and those who play 2 under the mixed strategy
profile 3¯δ. Formally, define f : Zk → Z by f(x1, . . . , xn) = x1 − x2. Then,
X := f(N(3¯δ)). Since f(e1 +N(3¯
δ)) = X + 1 and f(e2 +N(3¯
δ)) = X − 1,
dTV (e1 +N(3¯
δ), e2 +N(3¯
δ)) ≥ dTV (X + 1, X − 1)
≥ P (X + 1 > 0)− P (X − 1 > 0) = P (X ∈ {0, 1}).
The proof of Lemma 7 is concluded since X ∼ S2δ/kn .
4.2 The case k = 2
We present an analogue of Theorem 1 for the case k = 2. Let X1, X2, . . . be
i.i.d. Bernoulli(δ/2) random variables. Define
M(n, δ) = max
l,s∈{0,...,n}
P
(
l∑
i=0
Xi +
n∑
j=l+1
(1−Xj) = s
)
.
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Lemma 8. For every n ≥ 2 and δ ∈ (0, 1),
λ(n, 2, δ) = (1− δ)M(n− 2, δ).
Proof. By (4.1) it is sufficient to prove that
max
a∈[k]n
dTV
(
e1 +N(a
δ), e2 +N(a
δ)
)
= M(n, δ).
For every a ∈ [2]n there is an l ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that N(a) = (l, n− l) and
vice versa; therefore it is sufficient to prove that for each such pair a ∈ [2]n
and l ∈ {0, . . . , n},
dTV
(
e1 +N(a
δ), e2 +N(a
δ)
)
= max
s∈{0,...,n}
P
(
l∑
i=0
Xi +
n∑
j=l+1
(1−Xj) = s
)
.
Let X be the random variable that counts the number of players who play
1 under the mixed strategy profile aδ. Formally, X is defined by N(aδ) =
(X, n − X). Let f : x 7→ n + 1 − x. Since e1 + N(aδ) = (X + 1, f(X + 1))
and e2 +N(a
δ) = (X, f(X)),
dTV (e1 +N(a
δ), e2 +N(a
δ)) = dTV (X + 1, X).
Since X is PB, by Lemma 4,
dTV (X + 1, X) = max
s
P (X = s).
The proof is concluded since X ∼∑li=0Xi +∑nj=l+1(1−Xj).
4.3 Proof of Theorem 2
By Theorem 1, the first part of Theorem 2, the case k ≥ 3, follows from the
next claim.
Claim 9. For every k ≥ 2, n ≥ 1, and 0 < δ ≤ 1
2
, let η = pin δ
k
. Then,∣∣∣P (S2δ/kn ∈ {0, 1})− η− 12 ∣∣∣ = O(η−1).
Proof. For readability, let us abbreviate S
2δ/k
i by Si. Since
δ
k
≤ 1
4
(by the
assumption that δ ≤ 1
2
), the increments Si+1 − Si can be realised as the
difference of two i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables; therefore Sn is a Poisson
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Binomial random variable. Applying Lemma 5 with µ = E[Sn] = 0, σ
2 =
V ar[Sn] = nE[S
2
1 ] = 2nδk
−1, and t = 0, 1, gives∣∣∣∣σP (Sn ∈ {0, 1})− 2√2pi
∣∣∣∣ = O(σ−1),
which concluded the proof of Lemma 9.
The second part of Theorem 2, the case k = 2, stems from Lemma 8 and
the following claim.
Claim 10. Let 0 < δ < 1 and let X1, X2, . . . be i.i.d. Bernoulli(δ/2) random
variables. For every n ∈ N and l ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let X =∑li=0Xi+∑nj=l+1(1−
Xj) and η = pinδ
(
1− δ
2
)
. Then,∣∣∣∣ maxs∈{0,...,n}P (X = s)− η− 12
∣∣∣∣ = O(η−1).
Proof. Since X is PB with σ2 = V ar[X ] = n δ
2
(
1− δ
2
)
, by Lemma 5,∣∣∣∣σ maxs∈{0,...,n}P (X = s)− 1√2pi )
∣∣∣∣ = O(σ−1),
which concludes the proofs of Lemma 10 and Theorem 2.
5 Discussion
In the case of k = 3 we’ve obtained an exact characterisation (Theorem 1).
In the case of k = 2 we’ve only managed an asymptotic characterisation
(Theorem 2). If one really insists, then Lemma 8 can be considered an exact
characterisation for k = 2. We conjecture a nicer characterisation, however.
Conjecture 11. For every n ∈ N and δ ∈ (0, 1), let Sn−1 = Sδ(1−
δ
2
)
n−1 and
∆ = max{δ, 1− δ}, then
λ(2n, 2, δ) = P (Sn−1 = 0)
≥ λ(2n+ 1, 2, δ) ≥ ∆P (Sn−1 = 0) + (1−∆)P (Sn−1 = 1) .
Our missing piece in a proof for Conjecture 11 is the first equality, which,
by Lemma 8, is equivalent to the following probabilistic conjecture.2
Conjecture 12. For every n ∈ N, p ∈ (0, 1), and l ∈ {0, . . . , 2n}, let
Xl ∼ Binomial(l, p) and Y2n−l ∼ Binomial(2n − l, 1 − p) be independent
random variables. Then,
max
l,s∈{0,...,2n}
P (Xl + Y2n−l = s) = P (Xn + Yn = n) .
2Recently, while preparing this submission, Conjecture 12 has been proven [3].
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